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Study on labour supply when tax evasion is an option with 
Box-Cox functional forms and random parameters. 
Tiziano Razzolini†
ABSTRACT 
Labour supply when tax evasion is an option is analysed within a discrete choice framework 
which incorporates random parameters and Box-Cox functional forms, using mixed logit 
models. Deviates in parameters and, in some cases, correlation between alternatives in the 
evasion group are found to be significant.  
The models utilized yield good predictions in terms of labour supply and taxes paid by non- 
evaders. The goodness of fit and quality of prediction is improved by the introduction of 
correlation between random coefficients. 
JEL CODES: C25, H26, J22 
Keywords: Labour supply, tax evasion, mixed logit model. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes empirically the supply of labour when tax evasion, i.e. work in the 
irregular sectors, is an option. The analysis utilizes a random utility discrete choice 
model within the theoretical approach introduced by Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm 
(2005).  
 
The model is defined as discrete since labour supply choice is limited to a finite set of 
alternatives1. The underlying assumption is that individuals face only jobs with a 
limited number of hours, both in the regular and irregular sectors. The combination of 
 
† Address for correspondence: University Of Turin, Department of Economics, via real Collegio 30, 
10024, Moncalieri, Turin. E-mail tiziano.razzolini@unito.it. 
1 Van Soest (1995) introduces discrete choice model to analyze labour supply. He states that labour supply 
can be discretized since individuals face a limited number of options. The advantage of this approach is to 
avoid  problems  with nonlinear budget set. 
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2
these all possible amounts of hours in the regular and irregular sectors, yields all the 
possible alternatives the individual may choose.  
A clear distinction occurs between alternatives with full tax reporting and exclusive 
participation in the regular sector of the economy and choices that imply a participation 
in the irregular sector. The first one belongs to the “honest” group H, the second one to 
the “evading” group E. 
The discrete nature of choice set does not imply any kind of loss of information since it 
reflects the nature of the data available. Respondents give information on all the 
relevant quantitative variables, i.e. income, working hours, hourly wage etc., selecting 
the broad category where these values fall in. The empirical analysis is conducted on 
data from a randomized survey of Norwegian population whose responses contain 
individuals’ beliefs in acceptability of tax evasion and personal attitudes towards tax 
evasion. 
 
The contribution of the paper is an extension of the above mentioned model. Random 
parameters and correlation between alternatives through mixed logit specification are 
introduced. This approach leads to the estimation of significant deviations of 
individuals’ tastes and in some cases, differently from previous works2, of significant 
random coefficients into the utility function gives the opportunity to test an important 
aspect of tax evasion and labour supply issues underlined by many theoretical and 
empirical works, that is the presence of heterogeneity in the slope of labour supply 
curve3 which determines participation in the irregular sector. To this aim I use the 
mixed logit estimation procedure to test the existence of correlation between random 
coefficients of consumption and the random nest-specific coefficient for alternatives in 
the evasion group. The latter parameter represents the random taste of individuals for 
“cheating”.  
The use of random parameters is combined with a flexible Box-Cox specification of 
utility in leisure and consumption and with the inclusion of non-economic variables as 
 
2 Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005), Andresen (2005). 
3 This of course is the result of the interaction between substitution and income effect. 
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additional determinants of evading behaviour. Moreover, as in Jørgensen, Ognedal and 
Strøm (2005) and Andresen (2005), the specification of random utility incorporates 
variables that reflect the existence of social norms.  
Therefore the estimation results from specification with different assumptions on the 
functional forms and stochastic nature of parameters are compared. 
 
The main finding of the paper is that the stochastic nature of the model increases the 
flexibility of the model and improves its goodness of fit. However, as in many studies 
on labour supply, the probabilities of part time alternatives are over-predicted since the 
model does not explain the peaks in the distribution of hours of the jobs present in the 
market. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes briefly the state of literature 
and underlines the role of social norms in the determination of evading choice. Section 
3 illustrates the reasons and advantages that motivate the use of random parameters and 
of mixed logit approach. Section 4 provides a description of the dataset and describes 
the main characteristics of evaders. The model is explained in section 5. Section 6 
summarizes mixed logit estimation procedure, and section 7 presents the estimation 
results and their interpretations. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
Many theoretical works have highlighted the uncertainty beneath the decision to evade. 
The pioneering work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) describes the choice of evading 
as a kind of lottery where the evasion represents a more gainful but, at the same time, 
more risky asset. Cowell (1985, 1990) extends this framework treating the labour 
supply variable as endogenous and introducing therefore a double evaluation at margin: 
the conventional one between leisure and consumption and a “portofolio” choice 
between safe hours of work in the regular sector and more remunerative, but at the 
same time more risky, hours of work in the irregular sector. Jørgensen, Ognedal and 
Page 3 of 37
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
4
Strøm (2005) utilize agents’ utility maximizing behaviour under uncertainty in a 
discrete choice framework. 
This study follows Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005) but also takes into account the 
findings of many empirical works that accompanied the development of theoretical 
models and suggested the existence of other important determinants of evasion. The 
first models, however, by assimilating evasion decision to a portfolio choice, leaded to 
a strong over prediction of honest behaviour. Later, some authors underlined or 
formalized theoretically4 the presence of moral and social factors or norms. In these 
models the risk of being caught by tax audits could represent sources of anxiety for the 
individual. Possible forms of anxiety proved by the individual when evading or the risk 
of being judged as an evader by the community where the individual lives, are elements 
that may induce honest tax reporting. 
 
As in previous works5, the model in this paper assumes that agents maximize their 
utilities under uncertainty. However, differently from Lacroix et al. (1992) and 
Lemieux et al. (1994), this specification does not use marginal criteria and it is able to 
deal with non-convex budget sets. Like in Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005) the 
labour choice is discretized and random utilities with extreme value distribution are 
assumed. The combination of regular and irregular hours that characterizes each 
alternative, determines the consumption available and the leisure of the individual. The 
complete structure of tax function is taken into account in the computation of the 
available consumption level in each alternative, and thus the maximizing procedure 
results are much simpler. 
Utility of an individual is composed by a deterministic part and a stochastic one. The 
first consists of a function of leisure and consumption and of a nest specific constant 
(for alternative in group E) and variables related to social norms interacted with it.  
The stochastic part takes account of the presence of random deviates of parameters and 
of an additional random error that induces correlation between alternatives in the same 
groups. 
 
4 See for instance Elster (1989), Gordon (1989), Myles et al.(1990) and Erard et al.(1994). 
5 See for instance Lacroix et al. (1992) and Lemieux et al. (1994) 
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5
3 Motivation of random parameters 
The mixed logit approach in this paper is utilized mainly for two reasons: the 
possibility to mimic different pattern of correlation among the alternatives6, and the 
possibility to account for a random taste variation over choice characteristics. 
Preferences over attributes - or in this case over Box-Cox transformation of the 
attributes - are in fact characterized by random coefficients.  
 
The introduction of correlation between alternatives in the same group becomes 
important when there are unobserved factors that affect utility of group of alternatives. 
In the case of group of alternatives that shares the same unobserved attributes, the 
substitution pattern reflects this similarity and thus IIA property is ruled out. This 
means that the ratio of probability of an alternative m in group H and a generic 
alternative n of group E does not remain the same after changes that make a third  
alternative (in E or in H) more attractive. Therefore individuals who select an 
“evading” alternative are more likely to select another “evading” alternative if some 
attributes’ changes made their first choice no longer the most attractive.  
 
Random parameters in turn, by inducing deviation in tastes, also help to avoid IIA 
property. For instance, correlation among alternatives can be induced by setting the 
parameter of Box-Cox transformation of leisure as random, as I actually do in the 
estimation. A significant variation in this parameter implies that an individual with a 
high evaluation of consumption would always prefer choices with high level of 
consumption when the variance of the deviates is greater than zero. 
These deviations in tastes play an important role especially if we consider the 
importance of heterogeneity of agents in labour supply models. As many theoretical 
studies show7 the effect of government instruments (i.e. marginal tax, probability of 
 
6 McFadden and Train (2000) prove that mixed logit can approximate any random utility model.  
7 See, for example, Pencavel (1979) and Cowell (1985,1990). 
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detection and penalty) on labour supply in the irregular sector when labour supply is 
endogenous are ambiguous. The sign of comparative static results depends mainly on 
the slope of labour supply curve of individuals. 
Since consumption indirectly reflect utility from labour by allowing its coefficient to be 
random, I also take into account the taste variation of labour supply, and thus add a 
form of  flexibility in the model that makes the model closer to reality. 
Moreover, the mixed logit approach, as it will be shown in section 5, gives the 
possibility to introduce correlation between consumption (or leisure) random parameter 
and the individual attitude towards tax evasion.  
4 Data Description 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a data set constructed by a private survey 
bureau in Norway, the MMI. In 2003 this polling institute carried out a randomized 
survey of the Norwegian population. Participants included individuals above 15 years 
old who were asked if they wished to participate in the survey. 
 
The individual who accepted to participate received a questionnaire by post and was 
required to fill it in and mail it back with the guarantee of full anonymity. 
The response rate is moderately high. 73% of people who accepted the interview 
answered all the questions. The percentage of initially contacted individuals who 
completed the survey procedure is 62%. 
 
As for all surveys possible biases in the answers due to the selection bias in 
participation in the survey and respondents’ “agenda” problem may exist. It might be in 
fact that only people really involved in the issue agreed to participate, or that 
participants voluntarily gave untrue answers. 
However, the overall interview procedure consisted of two-stages and allowed for some 
control of the selection problem. In fact previous studies8 that used the same type of 
 
8 Isachsen,Klowland and Strøm(1982), Goldstein,Hansen, Ognedal, Strøm(2002) 
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7
surveys in Norway found out that the sample characteristics were not deviating 
significantly from the population ones. 
 
The answers to the questionnaire convey demographic information on the respondents, 
such as age, gender, marital status, non labour income, type of the job and labour 
supply.  
Moreover, participants were asked about the amount of hours in the regular sector and 
the amount of income earned in the irregular sector of the economy. The individual 
amounts of weekly hours in the regular sector are divided in five brackets: 0-20, 20-30, 
30-45, more than 45. The categories for annual hours in the black economy are 
represented by the brackets 0-10, 10-24, 25-49, 50-99,100-199,200.399, 400-599,600-
799,800-999, more than 1000. The possibility not to participate at all in the irregular 
sector is also included.  In order to define the two amounts of hours in each alternative I 
use the midpoints of the two series of categories described above. 
The questionnaire investigated also the beliefs of respondents about the functioning of 
the tax enforcement system. Respondents expressed their beliefs over the probability of 
being detected, and the fine in case of detection of evasion. These are the subjective 
values utilized by the individual in her decisional procedure. 
 
Some questions of the survey were targeted to measure the attitude of respondents 
towards tax evasion. The respondents answered about the social acceptability of tax 
evasion and about their propensity to evade when the opportunity for such behavior 
exists. 
Individuals below 20 and over 60, i.e. too young people or retired people, are excluded 
from the sample. Then, the amount of hours supplied in the regular sector of economy 
by the retained individuals is always greater than zero. The participation in the black 
economy for these individual seems thus to have the characteristics of a side job. 
Table 1 presents demographics characteristics of the sample and tax reporting 
decisions. 
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8
Descriptive statistics in Table 1, 2 and Table 3 reveal some interesting aspects. Female 
and older people evade less. This result is consistent with the great majority of 
empirical studies on this issue9. The differences between the subjective probability of 
being caught when evading and the perceived fine of evasion are minimal between 
evaders and non-evaders. 
An apparently surprising result is that average hourly wage of evaders is lower than 
hourly wage of non-evaders. Evaders also supply more hours of work in the regular 
sector than non evaders10. The higher average wage makes however the gross labor 
income of non-evaders higher. 
 
5 Model 
5.1 Definition of variables 
Leisure and consumption level have different definitions depending on whether 
alternative j belongs to group H or group E.  Each alternative is characterized by a 
combination of weekly hours in the regular sector pHh and annual hours in the irregular 
sector, lEh , p=1,..,P  l=1,..,L. The alternatives that include hours in the irregular sector 
belong to the “evasion” group (E); the alternatives that consist only of hours in regular 
sector are in the “honest” group (H). 
 
Leisure is computed as: 
lj =(8760-hj)/8760          [1] 
that is, as the difference between  the total amount of available annual hours in 
alternative j minus hj , i.e. the total annual amount of work of individual n if she chooses 
alternative j. 
9 See for instance the results from the experiment of Baldry (1987) and estimated on real data by Clotfelter 
(1983). See also Andreoni et al. (1998) for an excellent survey on the subject.  
10 The two latter results are however consistent with finding from other surveys, Lemieux et al. (1994), and 
may be interpreted by theoretical models, see for instance Cowell (1985,1990).  
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9
The difference in definition of leisure between the two groups simply consists of the 
definition of annual amount of labour jh .
pHj hh = [2] 
i.e. annual  hours in the regular sector for alternative in group H. 
lEpHj hhh +=  [3] 
That is the sum of amount of annual regular hours pHh plus the amount of annual hours 
in the irregular sector lEh .
The definition of consumption levels differs for alternatives in the two groups. 
The consumption level for alternatives in group H is: 
),( IRTIRC pHpHjH += Jj ,..,1= [4] 
where pHpHpH hwR = is the pre-tax annual wage income, with pHw as wage in the 
regular sector. I is the annual non labor income. ),( IRT pH  is the amount of taxes paid 
computed with a step-wise linear function of annual wage income and non-labor 
income.  
The available consumption when alternative j includes hours in the irregular sector, 
depends on the realized state of nature related to tax enforcement activity of 
government. Therefore, consumption available when government detects evasion with 
probability p is different from consumption level when evasion is uncovered. 
In case of non detection consumption is: 
),(, IRTIRRC pHlEpHNTjE ++= [5] 
Individual does not pay taxes on the amount of wage income lElElE hwR = from the 
irregular sector, with lEw being the wage in the irregular job.  
In case of detection, consumption is defined as follows: 
( )lElEpHlEpHTjE RIRRTIRRC +++= ),(, [6] 
That is, individuals pay taxes on the overall amount of labor income plus non-labor 
income. In addition, they pay a fine  on the amount of non-reported irregular income. 
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10
5.2 Utility specification and functional form 
As is usual in random utility approaches, individual n chooses alternative j that 
maximizes her utility. The utility for individual’s n alternative j is defined as follows: 
njnjnjnjsnjs uU 	 +++= n=1,..,N; j=1,..,J; s=E,H. [7] 
where nj is the usual iid extreme value used in standard logit models. njsu is the 
function of consumption and leisure level available in alternative j. nj	 contains 
stochastic components that  induce correlation between alternatives belonging to the 
same group (H,E). 
nj consists of interaction of personal characteristics and believes with a nest constant 
equal to one for alternatives in group E. This group of variables is meant to capture the 
effect of social norms. 
 
Due to the hazardous nature of the choice of evading, the utilities of “honest” and 
“dishonest” alternatives are built in two different ways. As already mentioned, in the 
case of evading strategy there are two possible states of the world: the case of detection 
and consequent sanction for evasion behavior, and the case when irregular hours are not 
uncovered.  The expected utility is:  
),..,()1(),..,( ;; XcuqXcquu NTjEETjnjE += [8] 
That is the sum of utilities in the two possible states of nature weighted by the 
respective probabilities. q is the perceived probability of detection  expressed by the 
individual in the questionnaire. 
 
The utility given by alternative j under honest strategy is: 
),..,( njnjHnnjH Xcuu = [9] 
 
The functional form of the utility is the same used by Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm 
(2005), and is specified as follows: 
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
 +++




 = 
 1)(1)10000/(),,( 221100 njnnnnjnnj
lXXcXlcu [10]  
where lnj and cnj are leisure and available consumption defined above11.
X1 represents age and X2 is a dummy that is equal to one for women. As indicated by 
the descriptive statistics these two variables seem to have a significant effect on evasion 
choices. They are thus allowed to affect individual utility through an interaction with 
the Box-Cox transformation of leisure12.
The Box -Cox functional form 




 

	 1x for leisure and income is equivalent to the 
logarithm when  is zero and equal to the linear case when  becomes one. The 
advantage of this specification is that quasi-concativity can easily be tested. 
However, this specification differs from Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005) since I 
consider the possibility that n0 and n0 are random parameters.  
These parameters consist of a mean and a deviation N from this mean. For example, 
nn 000  += where 0 is the population mean and 0 is a stochastic deviation 
which is meant to capture the variation of tastes between individuals 
(respectively nn 000  += ). 
This specification thus differs from a standard logit model with Box-Cox functional 
forms due to the presence of two additional stochastic components in the utility 
function i.e.: 
 




 

 1)10000/(
0
nj
n
c and 




 

 1
0
nj
n
l [11] 
These two stochastic components relax the IIA assumption of standard logit model 
since they induce another source of correlation over alternatives. 
 
11 Consumption and leisure are rescaled. Consumption level is divided by 10000 in equation [10]; leisure is 
divided by 8760 in equation [3.1]. The aim of rescaling is to reduce the log of condition number and 
consequently to avoid the precision lost in computing Hessian inverse and to speed the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure. 
12 For a detailed discussion and proof of the properties of Box-Cox transformation see Dagsvik and 
Strøm(2005). 
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As anticipated, the mixed logit approach offers also the possibility to test whether the 
two stochastic components are correlated13. The term nj	 in equation [7] introduces iid 
deviates to mimic correlation pattern similar to nested multinomial logit. This term is 
equal to: 
njs
E
njnj zd µ	 += 0 [12] 
where Enjd are dummies equal to one if alternative j belongs to the group of evading 
choices. 0 thus reflects a constant equal to one for all the alternatives of the “evasion” 
group.  njns zµ  can be considered as an error component: 
s
j
K
EHs
nsnjns dz 
=
=
,
µµ [13] 
 with ),( = HnjEnjnj ddz and s=H,E.  nsµ is a vector of iid deviates such that )(µV is 
diagonal with elements .,, EHss = These deviates are assumed to be normally 
distributed, ),0( sN  .
njns zµ  induces correlation between alternatives in the same nests. If, for instance, 
alternatives q and t belong to n st H (E) we have that 
( )( )[ ] Hntntstnqnqsqntnq zzECov µµ		 =++=),( )( E with s=H (E) while it is equal 
to zero if q and t belong to different nests. 
 
In this way I test the presence of correlation between alternatives belonging to the 
“honest” strategy and correlation of alternatives in the “evasion” strategy group.  
Differently from nested logit models the mixed logit framework does not impose 
homoskedasticity14. This higher flexibility has however a disadvantage: as shown by 
Ben-Akiva et al. (2001) and Munizaga et al. (2001) in the case of two mutually 
exclusive nests the variance of one must be normalized to an arbitrary value (for 
instance to one).  
 
13 As it will be shown later on this occurs through Cholesky factorization. 
14 Nested logit by construction is homoskedastic. Homoskedasticity can however be imposed in mixed 
logit.  
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In the present case, since there is a dummy for alternative in group E plus a stochastic 
component interacted with it, the coefficient of evading feature may be considered as 
random.  
 
The variables in nj reflect the effect of social norms on individual choices. 
332211 n
E
jn
E
jn
E
jnj ZdgZdgZdg ++= [14] 
E
jd is a dummy variable  equal to one when alternative j belong to E nest. 
 The remaining Z variables are all interacted with this dummy. These variables are 
individual characteristics or beliefs that affect behaviour and reflect features that may 
signal the presence of social norms. The sign of these coefficients represent their effects 
on the probability of choosing an alternative in group E. 
 The questionnaire includes various variables that may be interpreted as aspects of 
social norms. In particular, I use the belief of individuals on social acceptability of tax 
evasion, Zn1 equals one if the respondent believes that tax evasion is socially accepted. 
Another variable is the tendency of the individual to evade, i.e. Zn2 equals one if the 
respondent expresses his willingness to evade when such an opportunity exists. I 
consider also the salaried status of the worker, Zn3 equals one if the respondent is 
salaried15. These variables are interacted with the dummy Ejd equal to one if alternative 
j includes hours of irregular work. This approach takes into account the role of social 
norms in a fashion that is not so different from the g(Z) function used by Jørgensen, 
Ognedal and Strøm (2005).  
Here the effect of norms enters the specification of expected utility in the form of nest-
specific attributes. The Z variables are in fact interacted with the dummy variables 
E
id so that their parameters can be identified. Their effect on H alternatives is 
 
15 As suggested by most of the studies on real data employed workers evade less than self-employed. This 
variable therefore represents rather a different level of the opportunity of evasion than the effect of social 
norms. As note by Pestieau et al (1991) individuals might self-select into self-employment or salaried job 
according to their level of risk aversion. 
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normalized to zero; otherwise, since the Z-variables do not change over alternatives - 
being individual specific - they could not be identified. 
In Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005) specification, the g(Z) function was used as a 
multiplicative factor of the expected value of the maximum of the utility from 
alternatives in the evasion group. It could, however, be considered as a nest specific 
attribute of the evasion choice16.
The overall utility of alternative j for individual n can thus be written in a compact 
form. 
=njU (+j+Lµ njnjnj X +*) [15] 
where +j
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[16] 
 
16 Setting for instance g(Z)=exp(lng(Z)) we can see that this term has the same role of the multiplicative 
factor used by Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005) . 
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L is a lower triangular Cholesky factorization, such that =LL . In such a way, even 
utilizing iid deviates µ it is possible to induce any correlation pattern between 
stochastic components.  Correlation between random parameters may therefore be 
tested.  I focus in particular on the possible correlation between the error component of 
on parameter with the “nest” deviate Eµ . I want to test if the individuals who place a 
higher value on utility of consumption have also a higher (or lower) evaluation of the 
negative impact of the “cheating” nature of alternatives in group E.  
Since from [15] we have that: 
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the correlation between n0 and Eµ can be defined as follows: 
31110 ),( ssCov nE = . [19] 
Similarly, it is possible to verify the correlation between taste variation in the utility of 
leisure with taste variation in the utility of consumption. 
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In this case the correlation induced by the lower triangular matrix L is: 
211100 ),( ssCov nn =  . [20] 
 
6 Mixed logit17 estimation procedure 
As shown in equation [7], the random utility specification includes two different kinds 
of stochastic components: the iid extreme value distributed nj and the random 
components µn. The existence of stochastic components in µnj makes the standard logit 
formula no more sufficient to determine the choice probabilities. However, since the 
extreme value distributed unobserved error term  nj is independent of +nj and njX , it 
is possible to integrate out this random part of the utility and to compute  the 
probability of individual n choosing alternative j conditional on a value of parameter 
+nj. This probability is still represented by a standard logit formula: 

=


= K
k
X
X
njnj
nknk
njnj
e
eP
1
)(


 [21] 
Therefore, the mixed logit probabilities can be computed as a sum of these conditional 
standard logit probabilities weighted by the probability of observing the conditioning 
value of parameter +nj. That is, the unconditional probability is computed as the 
integral of the conditional probability over all the possible values of +nj.
njnjK
k
X
X
nj df
e
eP
nknk
njnj 


)(
1
 
=


= [22] 
The value of the integral depends on the distribution of +n and on the parameter that 
determines it (in general, the mean and the variance). The distribution function of +n is 
called the mixing distribution. 
 
17 For an exhaustive explanation of mixed logit see Train (2002) and Revel and Train (1998). 
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Simulation method is used to solve the integral in equation [22]. The first step of the 
procedure consists of drawing R values of +n from its distribution function. For each of 
these R values the conditional probabilities in equation [21], now defined as )( rnjnjL  ,
can be simulated. That is:  

=


= K
k
X
X
r
njnj
nk
r
nk
nj
r
nj
e
eL
1
)(


 r=1,..,R                  [23] 
Taking the averages of these conditional probabilities the simulated probability of 
alternative j may be computed as: 
=
=


=
R
r
K
k
X
X
nj
nk
r
nk
nj
r
nj
e
e
RP 1
1
1ˆ


r=1,..,R                 [24] 
 
The simulated probabilities njPˆ are unbiased estimator of the true unconditional 
probabilities njP and have other desirable properties18.
Hence, by substituting these values in the log-likelihood, a simulated log-likelihood is 
defined as follows: 

= =
=
N
n
K
k
nknk PdSLL
1 1
ˆln  [25] 
where dnj equals one if the k is the alternative selected by individual n.   
Usual numerical maximum likelihood procedure is implemented to find the MSLE 
estimator 	 that maximizes SSL. This vector contains the estimates of fixed parameters 
and the means and variances of the random ones. 
 
To estimate the mixed logit I used a modification of Kenneth Train’s Gauss program19.
The changes in the code consist of the inclusion of Box-Cox specifications and the 
introduction of correlation of the random parameters. 
 
18 The variance reduces as R increases. njPˆ is a smooth simulator and this fact makes easier the 
computation of derivatives, and consequently the numerical optimization.  
19 The GAUSS program is available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/train/software.html.
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In order to generate simulated probabilities I use 125 Halton draws. These randomly 
generated numbers posses some properties of coverage and covariance20 that reduce the 
number of draws for MSLE estimation21.
7 Estimation results 
This section discusses the results from estimation of models with different specification 
of the utility function, different number of random parameters and with various 
correlation patterns between these random components.  
Table 4 shows estimates obtained assuming that the utilities of leisure and of 
consumption have a Box-Cox functional form. These estimates help to understand the 
shape of the functional form of utilities of leisure and consumption. Model 1 does not 
contain any random parameter. Utility function estimated in model 2 has a random 
coefficient for 0 .
Results from both models suggest that utility of consumption has a logarithmic 
functional form. The coefficient for n0 is not significantly different from zero at 1 % 
level. The coefficient  is significant at 1% level and negative. However the beta-
coefficients, 0 1 2 , are not significant. The constant for evading alternatives 0
and proclivity to evade Z2 are significant at 1% level and respectively positive and 
negative. 
This means that the risky nature of evading choice reduces the utility of these 
alternatives and that those individuals who are inclined to evade, when possible, give a 
higher utility to alternatives that contain hours of irregular work. 
Both in model 1 and model 2 the variable Z3, i.e.  being salaried, does not affect 
significantly the probability of choosing an alternative in group E. Similarly, the effect 
of considering evasion acceptable is not significantly different from zero. The beta-
 
20 See Train(1999) . 
21 In order to obtain efficient and consistent MSLE estimator the number of draws must increase faster than 
the square root of the umber of observations. Therefore, by taking 125 Halton draws, I am much more 
above the required threshold.    
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coefficients, i.e. the constant o and the interaction of age, 1 , and sex , 2 , with Box-
Cox transformation of leisure are not significant. 
 
We use these estimates to compute the predicted probabilities PBHB and PBE of being honest 
and a tax evader, the predicted amounts of hours supplied in the two sectors and the 
respective tax revenues.  LBHB is the expected total amount of hours supplied in the regular 
sector. LBHB|H B is the expected amount of hours supplied in the regular sector conditional 
on being honest. Similarly LBE is the expected total amount of hours B,in the irregular sector 
and LBEB|E is the expected amount of irregular hours conditional on being an evader. T is 
the predicted total tax revenue, T|H is the expected revenue tax conditional on being 
honest. T|E  is the average tax paid by evaders and TH|E is the average true amount of tax 
evaders should pay. 
Table 5 shows predictions from models 1 and 2. Both models over predict hours in the 
irregular sector and consequently tax evasion. The interesting result is that model 2 
leads to higher over-prediction of evading behavior even if it is improving the 
likelihood, as it is possible to elicit from the mean log-likelihood value in Table 4. The 
introduction of additional random terms with full support unfortunately increases also 
the probability of less attractive alternatives, since even for these options this random 
term has positive values. This, however, is a common characteristic of many studies on 
labour supply which face the problem of explaining the lower demand for part-time 
jobs. Both models yield predicted amounts of hours in the regular sector that are quite 
accurate. 
 
Table 6 shows the results from models where the utility of consumption has a 
logarithmic functional form and the utility of leisure a Box-Cox form. Model 3 does not 
contain random parameters. Model 4 has one random parameter attached to the 
logarithm of consumption.  Model 5 has two random parameters: the coefficient n0 of 
consumption utility level and the coefficient n0 of leisure utility level. Model 6 has 
the same random parameters as Model 5 but in addition allows for a correlation 
between them. 
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The constant T0 for evading alternatives is significant at 1% and negative in all the four 
models. The effect of proclivity to evade on the probability of choosing an evading 
strategy is positive and significant at 1%. 
The coefficients 0 and  are significant at 1% and are, respectively, positive and 
negative in all models of Table 6. 
The coefficients for the deviates of the consumption parameter 0 , i.e. n0 , is 
significant in all models (4,5,6) where the corresponding coefficient is made random. 
The beta coefficients are all insignificant in model 3 and model 4. In model 5, where 
n0 is random, 0 and n0 are significant, respectively at 10% and 1% level. The 
coefficient of the interaction of leisure with the dummy for female, n2 , is positive and 
significant at 10% level. 
Deviates of 0 , i.e. n0 , are not significant in model 6, which contains a correlation 
term between the random component of the utility of consumption and the random 
component of the utility of leisure. The term 21s is found to be significant at 10% level, 
however the covariance between n0 and n0 , as shown in equation [18], is equal to 
the product s11s21. By applying derivative rule (see Revelt and Train (1998) ) this 
product is found to be insignificant.  
As in the case of model 1 and model 2 the introduction of random parameters increases 
the likelihood but, as can be verified from Table 7, the predicted level of hours of work 
in regular and irregular sectors and the predicted amount of tax evasion are much 
higher than the true ones. The more random terms with full support are introduced, the 
higher will be the probabilities of the less attractive alternatives22 in the E group and the 
higher will be the over-prediction of cheating behavior. 
 
The estimates of models 7,8,9,10 are shown in Table 8. These models contain 
specification with random parameters of utility and random parameters for nest. The 
latter induce correlation between the alternatives that belong to one of the two groups, 
E and H. 
 
22 These alternatives are represented by the choices characterized by a part-time supply of work in the 
regular sector. 
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As in the previous models, the constant for evading alternatives and the variable for the 
proclivity to evade are significant at 1% and are respectively, negative and positive in 
all the models of table 8. 
The empirical results from these models confirm the Box-Cox specification for utility 
from leisure and the logarithm form for utility of consumption, i.e.  is negative, 0 is 
positive and both are significant at 1%. In all four models, however, the coefficient 0
and its deviates n0 are not significantly different from zero. 
Concerning the correlation between alternatives in the same group, the results differ in 
the four models. As already mentioned, the variance Hµ of the error component for 
alternatives in the H group is normalized to one23.
The variance parameter µE (or more precisely its square root) for the evasion group is 
not significant in model 7, where the n0 coefficient is not random, but is significant in 
model 8,9 and 10, where n0 is allowed to vary. Hence, in addition to the effect of 
social and moral norms, there still exists a part of unobserved error component which 
captures the correlation between the two groups of alternatives. 
The variance of the 0 coefficient is significant only in model 9, where the correlation 
between the random coefficient n0 and the variance of evading choices is allowed. 
This correlation is found to be negative and significant at 5% level. The true correlation 
in fact is computed with the derivative rule24 as the product of s11 and s31 (see  [18]). 
This fact suggests that those individuals who place a higher value to consumption also 
receive a higher disutility from “evasion” alternatives. The comparative static results 
from theoretical models are ambiguous25 and these empirical finding might shed some 
light on the true nature of labour supply when tax evasion is an option. Such a negative 
correlation seems to be at odds with a stylized fact in descriptive statistics and, in 
particular, with the higher participation of low-wage individuals in the irregular sector. 
Given the adopted utility specification, for these individuals the marginal utility of 
consumption (dU/dC=V0n/C in the logarithmic case) should be higher. Hence, if labour 
 
23 Mixed logit version of nested logit in fact identifies only the sum of the two error components when the 
number of nest is only two. 
24 See Revelt and Train (1998). 
25 See Cowell (195,1990)  and Pencavel (1979). 
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supply curve is forward bending26, labour supply in the irregular sector(but also in the 
regular one) should be incentivated, leading to a greater level of tax evasion. Therefore, 
it seems counterintuitive that those individuals with a higher incentive to evade, 
especially if we consider that low-wage individuals actually evade more, are 
characterized by a higher disutility from evasion.  
However, n0 represents only the numerator of the marginal utility independently of the 
level of consumption which is common for all individuals (low and high income).  
The negative correlation may thus correct predicted behaviour of all individuals with 
high n0 . It might be that for individuals with a too high realization of n0 , the level of 
labour supply in the irregular sector is overpredicted. This overprediction may be 
particularly large for low wage individuals since, due to the low level of income, the 
marginal utility of consumption is very high. 
Another reason of the negative sign of this correlation may be related to the use of Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern specification of expected utility which assumes linearity in 
probability. This assumption, as some authors pointed out27, is not very realistic and 
may create misspecification if individuals overweight the probability of 
sanction/detection or if probability of detection is not exogenous.  It might be that 
individuals with a higher realization of n0 , and thus with more incentives to evade, 
may consider detection more likely to happen. This might be true if probability of 
detection is an increasing function of non-reported income. Thus, to counterbalance this 
higher perceived probability28 for evaders, the model estimates a negative correlation 
between n0 and disutility of evasion.  
A further reason of the existence of a negative correlation that corrects too high level of 
n0 might be assumption of normal distribution of the parameters. As may be noted in 
Table 4, 6 and 8 when 0 is made random the value of its mean increases. This depends 
on the fact that normal term has full support, including thus also highly negative values. 
 
26 This seems indeed to be the case since the evaders works more  both in the regular and in the irregular 
sector 
27 See, for instance, Kahneman, D., & Tversky (1979) and Jørgensen, Ognedal and Strøm (2005). 
28 It worth remembering that perceived probabilities are expressed in the questionnaire by broad categories. 
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As a consequence, willing to avoid as much as possible negative values of the marginal 
utility, the mean estimated by the model increases.  
 
As is shown in the specifications of Table 8 (in models 7,8,9,10) the higher the number 
of random coefficients the better is the likelihood of the estimates. 
As far as predictions are concerned, I find some differences between the implications 
from the latter four models. Table 9 contains the predicted values from those models.  
Model 7 yields prediction very similar to model 3, i.e. the same model without nests. 
Therefore, the introduction of correlation between groups of alternatives does not 
worsen the predictive power. 
The prediction of model 9, e.g. with correlation between n0 and variance Eµ in E 
group, yields the level of tax evasion that is more accurate than the prediction of the 
same model without this correlation parameters (model 8).  
Hence, due to the inclusion of correlation, a clear structure on the random components 
emerges, and this improves both the goodness of fit and the accuracy of predictions. 
 
In order to solve the problem related to full support of normal distribution I estimate the 
model assuming a lognormal distribution for the random parameter n0 29. Table 10 
shows estimates from model 11, which contains a unique lognormal random 
coefficients for n , and from model 12, which, in addition to random n0 , includes 
nest error terms Eµ and Hµ and allows for correlation between n0 and Eµ .
Estimates from models 11 and 12 shows that when the distribution of n0 is assumed to 
be lognormal, and thus the parameters have only positive values, the mean 0 is lower 
than the value estimated by the previous models. The goodness of fit is also lower. 
Predictions shown in Table 11 are however similar to the ones of models 7,8,10 with 
normally distributed n0 . However, these models yield slightly lower overpredictions 
of labour supply in the irregular sector and of evaded income. 
 
29 Uniform and triangular distributions were also assumed but the estimates of the deviates of random 
coefficient were found to be insignificant.
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The estimates from model 12 show that when lognormal distribution is assumed the 
variance of nest specific error terms and correlation between n0 and Eµ become 
insignificant. 
 
Therefore, the most suitable models both in term of economic interpretation, prediction 
and goodness of fit seem to be models 5 and 6. These two models do no contain neither 
nest specific random components nor other correlation terms. They allow for the 
random coefficient of n0 30. These two models are the only two specifications that 
have a significant value of 0 and for 2 (i.e. the interaction of leisure with female 
dummy). Model 5 is the unique specification that detects a significant deviates of the 
parameters n0 .
As shown in Table 7, HL , EHL | , HHT | and EHT | are accurately predicted, which means 
that model 5 can be used in practice by the government in predicting outcomes when 
tax rates or fines are changed. 
 
It is worth noting that in all specifications being salaried does not affect significantly 
the choice of honest or cheating behaviours. This fact seems surprising, since employed 
and self-employed individuals differ in the opportunities to evade and are subject to 
different conditions of tax-enforcement. However, the models implemented here do not 
capture any peculiarities in the reporting decisions of the two groups. 
 
8 Conclusion and suggestions for future research 
The paper improves the analysis of discrete choice labour supply model when tax 
evasion is an option through the inclusion of stochastic components and random 
parameters. Different distributional assumptions on random parameters are tested and 
their effects on goodness of fit and quality of predictions are verified. 
 
30 Different random distributions of  n0 were implemented in many other specifications, but the deviates 
were not found to be significant. 
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Deviates in marginal utility of consumption are always found to be significant, thus 
suggesting the importance of heterogeneity in consumer tastes on labour supply 
decisions.  
Empirical results highlight the importance of social and moral factors and, in particular, 
of the reported proclivity to evade. Some specifications find a significant effect of the 
reported social acceptability of evasion, and some models detect also the existence of 
unobserved attributes that, in addition to social and moral factors, distinguish honest 
behaviour from evasion strategies.  
 
As far employment status (employed or self-employed) is concerned, further 
improvements of tax-evasion analysis could be carried out through the development of 
functional forms of utility that account for the differences in the tax-reporting 
procedures and schedules of self-employed and employed workers. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the sample. 
 
Number of observations 659  
Number of non-evaders 
Number of evaders 
592 
67 
 
Percentage of female in the sample 48.7%  
Percentage of respondents who 
believe tax evasion is socially 
accepted 
52.6%  
Mean Standard deviation 
Age 41.29 10.06 
Hourly wage rate NOK 168.33 74.43 
Gross annual wage income(from 
regular sector) NOK 
326824.7 152429.4 
Weekly hours worked in the regular 
economy 
35.39 10.7 
Annual tax NOK 102787.9 67056.99 
Perceived fine if detected, percentage 
of income 
0.305 0.189 
Subjective probability of detection 0.1295 0.047 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of non-evaders. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of evaders 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Age 38.89 8.97 
Percentage of female in the sample 28.35%  
Percentage of respondents who 
believe tax evasion is socially 
accepted 
74.62%  
Hourly wage rate NOK 155.6045 56.62 
Gross annual wage income(from 
regular sector) NOK 
314597.7 146738.3 
Weekly hours worked in the regular 
economy 
37.43 14.63 
Annual tax NOK 97653.41 62977.93 
Perceived fine if detected, percentage 0.2985 0.2038 
Subjective probability of detection 0.1029 0.035 
Mean Standard deviation 
Age 41.56 10.14 
Percentage of female in the sample 51%  
Percentage of respondents who believe 
tax evasion is socially accepted 
50.16%  
Hourly wage rate NOK 169.77 76.09 
Gross annual wage income(from 
regular sector) NOK 
328212.8 153118.3 
Weekly hours worked in the regular 
economy 
35.16 10.15 
Annual tax NOK 103369 67528.93 
Perceived fine if detected, percentage 0.3058 0.1882 
Subjective probability of detection 0.13 0.047 
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Table 4. Estimates from model 1 and model 2 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Z3
(salaried) 
0.0020 
(0.3594    ) 
-0.0812 
(0.36490) 
Z1
(socially 
acceptable) 
0.4883 
(0.3285    ) 
 0.4691 
(0.31928) 
Z2
(incline to 
evade) 
1.5849*** 
(0.3254    ) 
1.5755*** 
( 0.31415)
0 -5.4949*** (0.4050 ) 
-5.5361*** 
( 0.43249)
 0.0424 
(0.1086    ) 
-0.4810 
(0.38102973) 
V0 3.0545*** 
(0.9628    ) 
25.0494 
(27.898) 
Y0n - 13.496 
( 18.3396)
 -13.596*** 
(2.9566   ) 
-10.2828*** 
(1.7423769) 
Z0 0.1244 
(0.1277    ) 
 
0.5869 
(0.44260) 
Z1 0.0961 
(0.1088) 
 0.3511 
(0.28066222) 
Z2 0.0970 
(0.0998) 
0.3967 
(0.2452) 
Mean log 
likelihood 
-1.55214   -1.5354800 
 
NOTE:Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** 1% level of significance 
** 5% level of significance 
* 10% level of significance 
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Table 5. Predictions from model 1 and model 2 
 
Variable means Observed Prediction 
MODEL1 
Prediction  
MODEL 2 
P(E) 0.10166920 0.1017 0.1012 
P(H) 0.89833080  0.8983 0.8988 
LH 1776.2421 1754.4598 1756.17 
LH|H 1768.2409 1770.03 1770.35 
LE 7.8581184 23.70 27.06 
LE|E 77.291045  233.153 267.41 
T|H (average tax 
paid by non 
evaders) 
98009.811 98976.41 99144.27 
T|E  (average tax 
paid by evaders) 
91902.805 88364.14 88758.52 
TH|E (average true 
amount of tax 
evaders should 
pay) 
97130.220  104460.27 107335.63 
T (overall average 
tax) 
97388.917 97897.47 98088.36 
EVASION= TH|E-
T|E 
5227.4149 16096.119 18577.099 
Page 31 of 37
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
32
Table 6. Estimates from model 3,4,5, and 6. 
 
MODEL 3  MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 
Z3
(salaried) 
0.0035 
(0.3595) 
-0.0682        
(0.3639)    
-0.0900        
(0.3662)     
-0.0360        
(0.3741 )   
Z1
(socially 
acceptable) 
0.4868 
(0.3285) 
0.4774        
(0.3325)     
0.4719        
(0.3364 )    
 0.5065        
(0.3393 )    
Z2
(incline to evade) 
1.5864*** 
(0.3255) 
1.5779***        
(0.3280)     
1.5758    ***    
(0.3315)     
 1.5836  ***   
(0.3317 )    
0 -5.4914*** (0.4049) 
-5.5625***        
(0.4132)   
-5.5724   ***   
(0.4137)   
 -5.6890 ***
(0.4329)   
V0 3.4104*** 
(0.3479) 
5.6160  ***      
(0.6729) 
5.1697   ***   
(0.4671 )   
 6.0077  ***
(0.6247     
Y0n 
(i.e. s11 ) 
- 2.6007 ***
(0.4015)     
5.1697    *** 
(0.4671 )   
 3.8678 ***
(0.5610)      -13.6791*** 
(2.9960) 
-10.6039    ***    
(2.2565)    
-16.6098 ***
(1.4326)   
 -9.8897 *** 
(1.3484)    
Z0 0.1190 
(0.1234) 
0.5276        
(0.4262)     
0.0814    * 
(0.0469     
 0.8709 *    
(0.4772)     
[0n  - 0.0548     **   
(0.0274 )    
 0.0023        
(0.0261)     
Z1 0.0917 
(0.1061) 
0.3375        
(0.3141)     
0.0636       
(0.0405)     
0.1707        
(0.1719)     
Z2 0.0953 
(0.0990) 
0.3008        
(0.2467)     
0.0491   *     
(0.0294 )    
 0.3193  *      
(0.1663)     
s21 - - - 0.6934 *
(0.3759)     
Mean log 
likelihood 
-1.55225 -1.54258 -1.52807 -1.52188 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** 1% level of significance 
** 5% level of significance 
* 10% level of significance 
The true correlation between n0 and n0 is, as explained in equations [3.18] and [3.20], equal to the 
product s11s21 and by applying derivative rule is found to be insignificant. 
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Table 7. Predictions from model 3,4,5, and 6. 
 
Variable 
means 
Observed MODEL 
3
MODEL 4 MODEL 
5
MODEL 
6
P(E) 0.10166920 0.1017 0.1014 0.1023 0.1018 
P(H) 0.89833080  0.8983 0.8986 0.8976 0.8982 
LH 1776.2421 1754.3465 1755.9296 1754.9246 1753.24 
LH|H 1768.2409 1768.2409 1770.76 1765.2506 1764.27 
LE 7.8581184 23.5723 27.56 29.05 29.63 
LE|E 77.291045  231.823 271.7253 283.9511 290.92 
T|H 
(average tax 
paid by non 
evaders) 
98009.811 98965.8 99103.231 98549.518 98561.883 
T|E  
(average tax 
paid by 
evaders) 
91902.805 88380.044 88570.629 92164.112 91182.248 
TH|E 
(average 
true amount 
of tax 
evaders 
should pay) 
97130.220  104380.64 1074492.18 112433.13 111736.11 
T (overall 
average tax) 
97388.917 97889.55 98032.39 97900.319 97811.601 
EVASION= 
TH|E-T|E 
5227.4149 16000.6 18921.54 20269.015 20553.86 
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Table 8. Estimates from model 7,8,9,10. 
 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 
Z3
(salaried) 
0.0171        
(0.4073) 
-0.0707        
(0.4313)    
0.1302        
(0.4373) 
0.0340        
(1.6781)     
Z1
(socially 
acceptable) 
0.5650        
(0.3637)   
0.5731        
(0.3830)    
0.6290*       
(0.3641)     
1.8452        
(1.3678)     
Z2
(incline to evade) 
1.7584***        
(0.3541)     
1.8230***        
(0.3710)     
1.8337***        
(0.3654)     
10.1829***
(4.7857)     
0 -6.0229***        (0.4584)   
-6.2515***        
(0.5103)   
-6.4545***
(0.4949)   
-23.4512***
(8.2124)    
V0 3.4077***        
(0.3484)     
5.6827***        
(0.6896)     
6.0703***        
(0.7690)     
5.0879***        
(0.5490)     
Y0n  
(i.e. s11)
- 2.6573***
(0.4146)     
2.9322***        
(0.4865)     
2.7611***        
(0.4719)     
\ -13.7116***        
(3.0216)    
-10.5529***        
(2.2414)    
-10.2616***
(2.1518)    
-19.3860***
(1.8476)   
Z0 0.1175        
(0.1230)     
0.5405        
(0.4351)     
0.6236        
(0.4821)     
0.0335        
(0.0233) 
[0n - - - 0.0274        
(0.0177)     
Z1 0.0909        
(0.1057)     
0.3489        
(0.3224)     
0.4138        
(0.3667)     
0.0296        
(0.0227) 
Z2 0.0944        
(0.0988)     
0.3086        
0.2517     
0.3574        
(0.2802)     
0.0205        
(0.0152 )    
s31† - - -0.5928        
(0.3639)    
-
µH 1.0000              
(normalized) 
1.0000              
(normalized) 
1.0000              
(normalized) 
1.0000              
(normalized) 
µE
(i.e. s33)
0.3341        
(0.2884)    ) 
0.7045***        
(0.2881)     
0.5562**        
(0.2266)     
11.2549***
(4.1711)     
Mean log 
likelihood 
-1.55208 -1.54209 -1.53973 -1.52479 
NOTE:Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** 1% level of significance,** 5% level of 
significance,* 10% level of significance.   
†In model 9 the Cholesky composition of random terms follows equation [3.18]. 
Therefore, 31110 ),(),( ssCovCov noHEn == µ , where s11 is the coefficient of no . The standard 
deviation of nest error term Eµ is equal to 233231 ss + . Variance-covariance matrix of s11,s31 and s33 is:                       











=
0513.00042.0014.0
0042.01323.007.0
014.007.0238.0
)( ijsVar
 
By applying derivative rule, see Revelt, and Train (1998), we have that Cov(]no, µE)=-1.73 with a 
standard deviation of 0.98, thus significant at 10% level. The standard deviation of nest error term Eµ is 
equal to 0.8132 wit h a standard deviation of 0.29, hence significant at 1% level. 
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Table 9. Predictions from model 7,8,9,10. 
 
Variable 
means 
Observed MODEL 
7
MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 
10 
P(E) 0.10166920 0.1016 0.10148074 0.10256140 0.10137376 
P(H) 0.89833080  0.8984 0.89851926 0.89743860 0.89862625 
LH 1776.2421 1754.38  1755.6646 1757.8127 1755.1890 
LH|H 1768.2409 1769.95 1770.8988 1782.0008 1767.3033 
LE 7.8581184 23.57 27.553942 26.082517 28.222954 
LE|E 77.291045  231.80 271.51893 254.31124 278.40492 
T|H 
(average tax 
paid by non 
evaders) 
98009.811 98968.22 99111.562 99760.887 98786.642 
T|E  
(average tax 
paid by 
evaders) 
91902.805 88382.84 88352.890 84312.406  
 
90243.736 
TH|E 
(average 
true amount 
of tax 
evaders 
should pay) 
97130.220  104382.38 107260.23 102009.00 109937.38 
T (overall 
average tax) 
97388.917 97892.017 98017.736 98190.252 97918.092 
EVASION= 
TH|E-T|E 
5227.4149 15999.532 18907.336 17696.590 19693.642 
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Table 10. Estimates from model 11,12. 
 MODEL 11 MODEL 12 
Z3
(salaried) 
-0.0212 
(0.3604) 
0.1437 
(0.4631) 
Z1
(socially acceptable) 
0.4849 
(0.3298) 
0.6451 
(0.3941) 
Z2
(incline to evade) 
1.5829*** 
(0.3263) 
1.9212*** 
(0.4897) 
0 -5.7173*** (0.4072) 
-6.566*** 
(0.8537) 
V0 1.3636*** 
(0.1086) 
1.3765*** 
(0.1066) 
Y0n  
(i.e. s11)
-0.3741*** 
(0.0608) 
-0.3880*** 
(0.0687) 
\ -12.5826*** 
(2.7373) 
-12.5933*** 
(2.7385) 
Z0 0.2060 
(0.1964) 
0.2043 
(0.1939) 
Z1 0.1532 
(0.1637) 
0.1606 
(0.1668) 
Z2 0.1487 
(0.1431) 
0.1542 
(0.1459) 
s31† - 0.6769
(0.5400) 
µH - 1.000
(normalized) 
µE
(i.e. s33)
- -0.7954 
(0.8721) 
Mean n 4.1922 4.2706 
St.error n 0.5282 0.5548 
Mean log 
likelihood 
-1.54937 -1.54793 
NOTE: *** 1%, ** 5%,* 10% 
no is normally distributed. n is log- normally distributed  since it is equal to exp ( )0110 ns  + . Its 
mean is equal to )2/)2^(exp( 110 sm +=  and its standard deviation is equal to 
).1)2^exp((*. 11 = smdst Variance of the nest error term Eµ and ),( EnCov µ computed by 
applying derivative rule are not significant. 
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Table 11. Predictions from model 11,12. 
 
Variable 
means 
Observed MODEL 11 MODEL 12 
P(E) 0.10166920 0.1016 0.0946 
P(H) 0.89833080  0.8984 0.9054 
LH 1776.2421 1755.89 1752.5772 
LH|H 1768.2409 1771.2134 1756.44 
LE 7.8581184 25.02 26.25 
LE|E 77.291045  246.28 277.512 
T|H (average 
tax paid by 
non evaders) 
98009.811 99075.824 98777.905 
T|E  (average 
tax paid by 
evaders) 
91902.805 88509.243 88432.203 
TH|E (average 
true amount of 
tax evaders 
should pay) 
97130.220  1055576.54 106666.74 
T (overall 
average tax) 
97388.917 98001.528 97726.066 
EVASION= 
TH|E-T|E 
5227.4149 17067.298 18234.538 
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